Health & Safety Reps Page
Heat exhaustion – union sets 27° maximum
17 May 2007
ASLEF is to advise all its members to refuse to work in train cabs where the heat levels rise above 27°C.
The executive committee took this decision today after receiving reports indicating that there were very few agreed arrangements in place to mitigate the risks from heat exhaustion. It is concerned to avoid the position last year when, during the hottest months, SPADs (signals passed at danger) rose by 62%.
General Secretary Keith Norman will advise all Train and Freight Operating Companies of today’s decision by the executive. ‘We will also send out the appropriate legal and Health & Safety advice to all branches and reps – so that they have Irrefutable justification for any action,’ he said.
The one not guilty for Ladbroke Grove was the driver.
By Alan Marshall.
Posted 1 May 2007 09:00 | From Railnews print edition, May 2007
www.railnews.co.uk/2007/05/opinions/200705P_op_marshall.html
MORE than seven years after the tragic events at Ladbroke Grove, it can now be said with certainty, and without risk of being in contempt of court, that the one person who was not responsible for the 130 mph head-on collision was Thames Trains' driver Michael Hodder, although for many it was convenient to blame him for passing signal 109 at danger. After all, dead men can't argue back.
Now, after an amazingly protracted legal process, Railtrack has been found twice as guilty as Thames Trains, in that it has been fined £4 million compared with Thames's fine of £2 million for failing to give proper training to driver Hodder, or, indeed, the trainer who trained him.
Many people, including victims' relatives, thought the Network Rail fine was not severe enough. But as Mr Justice Bean said: "Every pound they are fined will be £1 that cannot be spent on railway safety."
Even so, at the end, the whole outcome has been totally unsatisfactory.
Railtrack, its former shareholders and the people who were really responsible for the tragedy that killed Michael Hodder, plus Brian Cooper, the driver of the FGW train, and 29 passengers, and injured over 400 more remain untouched. There is surely something wrong with a criminal justice system that allows this to happen.
After Railtrack took over responsibility for the infrastructure in 1994, it continually flouted its own safety standards, which almost certainly would have led to changes in the design and layout of signalling on the routes out of Paddington.
The trouble was that while Railtrack's Safety and Standards Directorate laid down safety rules it had no power to enforce them.
The chief executive officer and the director of safety and standards reported separately to Railtrack's chairman. The intention of this split was to demonstrate that safety was not being compromised by commercial considerations.
But responsibility for safety was devolved to the zonal directors and they reported to the chief executive, not to the director of safety and standards.
So the organisation structure, whilst looking superficially attractive because it appeared to demonstrate independence, was in fact ineffective.
"There had been 46 previous Spads in the Paddington area between 1993 and the date of the crash," said Justice Bean. "No less than eight of these had been at signal SN 109. All eight involved different drivers, mostly experienced.
"The sixth, on 4 February 1998, was known (after the name of the driver) as the Bunney Spad and was particularly serious. The train, a First Great Western train, overshot the signal by about 300 yards, and a head-on collision with an oncoming train was only narrowly averted."
What the judge didn't say was that this was also a carbon copy of the Southall crash, which had killed seven passengers two years earlier, for driver Bunney's HST was equipped with automatic train protection, which had not been switched on because he hadn't been trained how to use it.
The judge pointed out that no signal sighting committee followed the Bunney incident, even though Railtrack's Group Standards required it.
The Bunney Spad was followed by a formal investigation but, said Judge Bean, "it was not adequately rigorous, the conclusions were flawed and the recommendations inadequate."
In a serious criticism of the Railway Inspectorate, Judge Bean added: "A Principal Inspector of Railways was asked by the deputy chief inspector to report on SN 109 following the Bunney Spad. In his report he did not criticise the configuration, sighting, visibility or readability of SN 109."
Instead, said the judge, the inspector suggested that driver Bunney may have been confused by flashing yellow signals on the approach to SN 109, and these were removed in January 1999, perhaps lulling Thames Trains into a false sense of security.
Judge Bean said that at the earlier trial of Thames Trains the judge "made this pithy observation with which I would concur: 'if a signal has been passed at danger on several occasions by different drivers, the common factor is the signal, not the driver'."
He also quoted Lord Cullen's report: "The failure to have signal sighting committees convened was persistent and serious. It was due...to a combination of incompetent management and inadequate process."
As for inadequate processes, it is noteworthy that while the rail industry arbitration body found Thames Trains primarily responsible for Ladbroke Grove, Judge Bean took the opposite view: "The aspect of the case which to my mind renders Railtrack's failures substantially graver than those of Thames Trains," he said, "is that they persisted, despite the series of Spads at SN 109, of which the Bunney Spad... was the sixth and by far the most serious [and] a dress rehearsal for the disaster of 5 October 1999."
Finally, seven and a half years after the tragedy, relatives and victims have achieved closure. But for others, such as those involved with the Potters Bar crash five years ago, the problems linger on as they still await a full inquest - for, unlike Ladbroke Grove, there has been no public inquiry.
To quote Judge Bean: "I too am dismayed, as many members of the public will be, that matters have gone on so long."
Steve Gurdler
I have attended T.U.C. courses : Health and Safety stage 1 and stage 2.
A five day residential company IOSH course provided by Connex.
Two ASLEF residential Health & Safety courses at Wortley Hall, Sheffield.
I have safety walks/inspections with local management 4 times a year, one of these is done in the dark and additionally when major changes are planned. My areas are the Train Crew depot, conference room, station, walking routes and sidings. I can also investigate staff accidents.
I am also currently a member of the Fleet User Group and I am able to raise concerns regarding any problems with our trains.
If you have any safety matters please contact me.
E-mail: steve.gurdler@aslefonline.co.uk
or leave a note in my pigeon hole at the depot.
Local Safety Walks
TUESDAY 27 FEBRUARY AT 09 00
FRIDAY 1 JUNE 2007 AT 09 00
FRIDAY 14 SEPTEMBER 2007 AT 09 00
FRIDAY 7 DECEMBER 2007 AT 04 00 HOURS
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